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FROM PARMENIDEAN IDENTITY TO BEYOND CLASSICAL
IDEALISM AND EPISTEMIC CONSTRUCTIVISM
ОТ ПАРМЕНИДОВСКОГО ТОЖДЕСТВА — ЗА ПРЕДЕЛЫ
КЛАССИЧЕСКОГО ИДЕАЛИЗМА И ЭПИСТЕМИЧЕСКОГО
КОНСТРУКТИВИЗМА
Introduction
One of the most epistemologically significant questions is if, starting from our
ideas, we can attain knowledge of reality. Realistic doctrines affirm that a positive
answer should be given to this question, whereas idealists affirm that it is impossible
to transcend the realm of our ideas to find out what reality is really like.
The realistic attitude is grounded on the view (or, if one prefers, the presupposi-
tion) that ‘reality’ exists independently of our knowledge. In particular, the two
main tenets of metaphysical realism — as Rockmore characterizes it — are an onto-
logical one, according to which reality exists in itself and is independent of our
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Rockmore’s paper offers a nice discussion on how classical German idealism provi-
des a plausible account of the Parmenidean insight that thought and being are
identical and suggests that idealist epistemic constructivism is arguably the most
promising approach to cognition. In this short commentary, I will explore the im-
plications of adopting other interpretations of Parmenidean identity thesis, which
arguably lead to different conclusions than the ones drawn by Rockmore. En route
to disavow the distinction between ontology and epistemology, I argue that one
may adopt an approach on cognition which would be immunized to worries that
prompt Rockmore’s elaboration and also embrace (at least) some of its benefits.
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knowledge of it and an epistemological one, according to which we are ab-
le to know what reality is like.
On the contrary, the idealistic attitude implies an ontological depen-
dence of things on our ideas. Berkeley’s subjective idealism was grounded
on this conception. The transcendental idealism of Fichte (as a version of
subjective idealism), Schelling and Hegel (as versions of objective ideal-
ism) was grounded on the ontological identity of reality and thought; in this
sense, reality is, according to them, reduced to thought. However, in Schel-
ling and Hegel, this identity is about the way in which given worldly things
are being present in our cognitive capacities, whereas they are not produ-
ced by them. Therefore, it could be argued that identity presupposes an on-
tological distinction between the content of our ideas and the worldly ob-
jects which are represented in them.
Rockmore’s paper offers a wonderful and thought-provoking discussi-
on on how classical German idealism provides a plausible account of the
Parmenidean insight that thought and being are identical and suggests that
idealist epistemic constructivism is arguably the most promising approach
to cognition. He further contrasts epistemic constructivism to metaphysical
realism, the main argument against which is that its main tenet that there is
a mind-independent external world has never been demonstrated. Howe-
ver, one could counterargue that the same holds for epistemic constructi-
vism.
In this short commentary, I will explore the implications of adopting
several interpretations of Parmenidean identity thesis, which arguably lead
to different than the ones drawn by Rockmore conclusions. Moreover, I cir-
cumscribe an approach to cognition based on the knowability of the
mind-independent external world, which would arguably be immunized to
worries that touch off Rockmore’s argumentation. Such an approach could
incorporate at least some of the advantages of epistemic constructivism, for
which Rockmore argues.
In order to do this, I attempt a different than Rockmore’s reconstructi-
on of several episodes of the history of philosophy, aiming to highlight so-
me interesting interrelations.
Parmenidean identity thesis: Alternative
interpretations
It is interesting for my purposes to shortly discuss some interpretations
of Parmenidean identity thesis which differ from the one adopted by Rock-
more.
In its most radical interpretation, it follows from identity of being and
thinking that nothing additional can exist. In this line of reasoning, Parme-
nidean identity thesis is a claim that being is reduced to thought; in other
words, that nothing exists except thought.
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However, other interpretations radically differ from the aforementio-
ned one. For example, Burnyeat attributes to Parmenides the view that
thought refers to being: “it is one and the same thing which is there for us to
think of and is there to be: thought requires an object, distinct from itself,
and that object, Parmenides argues, must actually exist” [Burnye-
at, 2012: 255]. Such an interpretation, as Rockmore discusses, suggests
that cognition requires, an ontological distinction between the cognitive
subject and object as well as a cognitive identity between the subject that
knows and the object that is known.
Moreover, Burnet claims that “Parmenides is not, as some have said,
the ‘father of idealism’; on the contrary, all materialism depends on his
view of reality” [Burnet, 1930: 182]. It turns that Parmenides’ monism and
his identity thesis should be jointly discussed in any venture to trace Parme-
nides’ impact on the history of philosophical controversies about the nature
and the scope of human cognition. As Kahn states “Parmenides’ monism …
had an important development in ancient and medieval philosophy and sig-
ni?cant parallels in modern monism since Spinoza and Hegel. The identi?cati-
on of Mind and Being; that is, of cognition with its object” [Kahn, 2009: 163].
In another interpretation, Parmenidean identity thesis is not primarily
as a thesis concerning being, but as one concerning knowing. In this sense,
it states that when knowing occurs, being and thinking become one and,
then, experience is as much objective as subjective. In Kahn’s words “[t]he
‘is’ which Parmenides proclaims is not primarily existential but veridical:
it asserts not only the reality but the determinate being- so of the knowable
object, as the ontological ‘content’ or correlate of true statement”
[Kahn, 2009: 155]. In this sense, it is the thinking that is reduced to being
and not vice versa: “the mind does not impose its forms but receives them
from the object it knows” (Kahn, 2009: 166). Such an understanding would
be equally at home in both Plato and Hegel.
It seems, then, that Parmenidean identity thesis could be read as if it
points to both an objectivist and a subjectivist stance and it is an open ques-
tion which one of them is to be adopted. In Hegel’s understanding of Par-
menides’ identity thesis, since there is nothing other than Being, thinking is
identical with its Being, for there is nothing other than Being” [Hegel,
1970: 289–90]. Thus, Parmenides’ indeterminate being serves as Hegel’s
starting point for systematic thinking in general. In Hegel’s line of reaso-
ning, thinking starts necessarily from being (as Parmenides argues), and
therefore the “indeterminate Being” cannot be determined by and for thin-
king. On the contrary, Fichte argues that “self-consciousness is the identity
of thinking and being” [Fichte, 1992: 382 n.] and Heidegger affirms that
“because thinking remains a subjective activity, and thinking and Being
are supposed to be the same according to Parmenides, everything becomes
subjective. There are no beings in themselves. But such a doctrine, so the
story goes, can be found in Kant and German Idealism. Parmenides alrea-
dy basically anticipated their doctrines” [Heidegger, 2000: 14].
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Representationalist accounts of knowledge
I contend that the issue under discussion is closely linked to a certain
understanding of the representational content of our cognitive claims, ac-
cording to which cognitive claims confer knowledge because and as long
as they constitute accurate representations of the external world. The view
that cognitive claims successfully capture features of the world is affiliated
with any variety of realism and Rockmore offers a nice and historically in-
formed discussion of the issue.
The roots of representationalist accounts on knowledge may be traced
back to Locke. According to these accounts, we cannot have direct ac-
quaintance with objects of knowledge; they can be approached only via
ideas, which represent them. In other words, what we immediately know is
our representations or ideas, not reality itself. Hence, proponents of such
accounts conceive knowledge as congregation of representations which are
arguably accurate reproductions of external reality and this is why they can
stand truthfully for them. In other words, the external world is not directly
presented to the consciousness. The content of our thoughts and knowledge
consists of a collection of internal representations of some kind. Thus
knowledge is identified with internal representation.
The main difficulty for such views is that they cannot provide justifica-
tion of the ideas that we are supposed to formulate via representation by
any other means than our ideas themselves, since our consciousness is sup-
posed not to have direct access to the things (broadly construed) which are
represented by our ideas. In other words, they have to give an account on
the relationship between internal and external representations. For that pur-
pose, one would need to know what internal representations are like and
how they are connected to external representations of the world or the
world itself.
This problem has survived for a long time since then, as a feature of the
doctrines deployed by several philosophers throughout history. Among
them, Kant is a commanding figure. On this road, epistemology was given
birth. Man’s limited capacity to know how things are turned into a conditi-
on of empirical knowledge; one has to explain how things can be given to
representation. In the Kantian line of philosophical doctrines, knowledge is
understood in terms of the relation between the objective knowledge sub-
strata, offered by the world, and the cognitive skills of the subject.
Kant transformed the unresolved scientific problem of the relation of
sensations to their objects into a question about the possibility of know-
ledge. This question was to be resolved in the sphere of representation. It
should be noted that Kant maintains, with regard to the ontological aspect
of the issue, that inner thoughts prove the existence of the external world.
Rorty notes that “the Kantian picture of concepts and intuitions getting
together to produce knowledge is needed to give sense to the idea of ‘theory
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of knowledge’ as a special philosophical discipline” [Rorty, 1979: 168].
Rorty himself started his anti-representationalist and anti-epistemological
campaign from this point. He urges us to stop thinking of knowledge in
terms of representing accurately that what is outside the mind. He main-
tains that grasping the world in itself amounts to platonism (a form of meta-
physical realism, according to Rockmore). On the contrary, Rorty suggests
that it could only be grasped philosophically, within time and history.
Hacking, among others, contests the role of representations as
truth-hunters and pleas for a non-representationalist view of science, put-
ting emphasis on experimentation and material agency. In fact, Hacking
contests the very notion of reality as it is commonly understood and favors
a view of it as a fictitious construction, by arguing that it is second-order
concept that follows from our practice of representation: “The world has
an excellent place, even if not the first one…It was found by conceptuali-
zing the real as an attribute of representations” [Hacking, 1983: 136]. This
attitude is pretty close to the one defended by Rockmore.
In this line of reasoning, epistemological problems arise due to the as-
sumption that, in order to give us knowledge of the world, our representa-
tions have to be more or less accurate or truthful reflections of it. It could be
argued that a way-out of this problem is to state that representations are not
meant to represent the world as it is. In this line of reasoning, our represen-
tational vehicles create effects that our cognition is unlikely to essentially
capture from reality, since there is nothing to capture, once objectivity and,
arguably, mind-independency of the objects of knowledge are undermined.
Therefore, in line with these views, objects of cognition could be conceived
of as constructions whose existence is relative. Such a view could be regar-
ded as a radical version of Rockmore’s epistemic constructivism.
Representationalism, epistemic constructivism
and pragmatism
In contradistinction with representationalist accounts, it has been ar-
gued that trust in cognitive claims is an empirical and/or contextual issue.
Under this prism, one could see Rockmore’s epistemic constructivism and
also pragmatic approaches. In both epistemic constructivism and pragma-
tism, non-epistemic values are taken into account as contributors to cogni-
tive success and, thus, the realistic attitude according to which our cogniti-
ve claims are rendered true by the existence of facts with corresponding
elements and similar structures is surmounted.
From this point of view, I would like to shortly comment on Rockmo-
re’s reference to Brandom as an example of a modern thinker who adopts
the view that we can and in fact do cognize the mind independent world as
it is, appealing to the affinity of his views to the early Wittgenstein’s view
that language hooks up with the world. However, I maintain that this is on-
ly the one side of the coin.
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Brandom is mostly influenced by Rorty’s pragmatism, while being cri-
tical to classical pragmatists. His pragmatic concerns are deployed in his
version of inferential semantics, by which he contests the representationa-
list idea that the function of thought and language is to provide a transcript
of reality. In this context, words like ‘true’ and utterances like ‘refers to’
are not transcriptions of any indigenous in the domain of reality content.
Following Rorty, Brandom rejects that one could provide accurate repre-
sentations of the surroundings of the inquiry. It is not of any significance or
interest whether one or the other way of talking is an accurate description
of the surroundings. Ways of talking should and could not be evaluated in
terms of accuracy; the virtues of the practices that are involved in their usa-
ge suffice for their evaluation.
Brandom argues that the essence of pragmatism is the denial that se-
mantics is conceptually autonomous from pragmatics. He claims that “it is
pointless to attribute semantic structure or content that does no pragmatic
explanatory work” [Brandom, 1994: 144]. Along these lines, one could al-
so discuss Dummett’s denial that one can grasp content which goes beyond
anything that could be veri?ed or Quine’s denial that there is any objective
grounds for choosing between competing translation manuals that make
the same predictions upon patterns of use. From this perspective, Bran-
dom’s line of reasoning could also be seen as being as close to epistemic
constructivism.
Reconstructing representation
I argue that one can embrace the motivation behind epistemic con-
structivism (and pragmatism), without adopting either of them as a stance,
on the grounds of a reconstruction of our conception of representation in a
way which pays due attention to the aforementioned criticisms.
In the epistemological context I endorse, human social practice is the
departing point of our cognitive activities: knowledge is not causa sui, its
content is objective and our representations of reality can grasp its features
because they are reconstructions of the systems we gain cognitive access to
by the means of the artifacts employed in our theoretical inquiries. The pro-
cess of cognition is active interference in objective reality by the means of
our cognitive artifacts, sign-systems and conceptual frameworks. These re-
presenting artifacts functions as surrogates in activity performed throug-
hout our inquiries, by piloting our intervention with the objects of cogniti-
on which they are meant to represent.
In these lines, to know means to manipulate the object of knowledge,
to transform it into a tool of action. An object becomes a specific object of
cognition, acquires its specific meaning and unveils previously unrecogni-
zed aspects of its existence within its interaction with the cognizing sub-
ject, the human-agent [Azeri, 2013: 1122]. Therefore, cognition is always
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about nature humanized by activity and its object exists objectively in the
course of the process of its ideal reproduction in thought.
In order to shed more light on this view, let me shortly discuss Marx
Wartofsky’s views on the role of representation in cognition. Wartofsky
was the only Marxist among the pioneers (i.e. Toulmin, Russell Hanson,
Feyerabend, Kuhn) in the movement to integrate the history of science with
the philosophy of science. As anyone would expect from a literate Marxist,
Wartofsky puts emphasis on practice, rejects the traditional Kantian-rooted
conception of representation, uses tool-metaphors as opposed to visi-
on-metaphors, puts emphasis on the concrete use of models in scientific
work and focuses on change rather than stability. An important feature of
his views is that he had a considered balance between the conceptual chan-
ges in science and the demand for some sense of direction and improve-
ment in the succession of scientific theories. I maintain that Wartofsky’s
contribution goes beyond these aspects and could be suggestive for our dis-
cussion.
In his historical epistemology, Wartofsky, considering knowledge as
being itself the subject of historical evolution, maintains that the crucial
factor of human cognitive practice is the ability to make representations.
Human beings, when producing an artifact, are at the same producing a re-
presentation, since these artifacts do not only have a use, but also represent
the mode of action in which they are used or the mode of their own produc-
tion [Wartofsky, 1979: xiii].
Wartofsky underlines that this discussion about representation imputes
an epistemology in which the knowing subject confronts a surrogate object
of knowledge as a representation of the external world. Moreover, he per-
sists that the emphasis should be shifted from what representation is to the
activity of representing. He is clearly distant from views that consider re-
presentation to be a case of denotation. According to him, representation
essentially involves reference and meaning, thus reference is a constitutive
aspect of representation, while referring is also construed as an intentional
activity [Wartofsky, 1979: xxi]). One should not defy that this entails that
models are truth-hunters, since they purport reference and reference purp-
orts truth and falsity [Wartofsky, 1966/1979: 10].
Wartofsky insists on the realism of his thesis, since he maintains that,
in our representations, the represented objects, events or processes, are
represented as material objects, events or processes of a material world
[Wartofsky, 1966/1979: 1] – my emphasis). The representations he is
talking about are in fact derivatives, generated by our own activity of
representing, in which we take the represented physical objects as
representations. He further claims that our making of representations is the
actual praxis of creating concrete, worldly objects, as representations
[Wartofsky, 1979: xxii]. This is the point, where I think that an approach
along these lines could arguably embrace some of the benefits of adopting
epistemic constructivism, as they are presented by Rockmore.
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Vico and Marx
In order to address the previous point in some detail, I would now turn
to some of Vico’s views1, to whom Rockmore also appeals.
One of the most important and characteristic features of Vico’s thin-
king is his discredit of the Cartesian-positivistic approach to knowledge.
He elaborated and suggested a system of thought, based on the verum-fac-
tum principle, aiming to propose an alternative to Cartesianism. According
to the verum-factum principle we (human beings) can only know what we
ourselves have made or are in principle capable of making:
“But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity, so
remote from ourselves, there shines the eternal and never failing light
of truth beyond all question: that the world of civil society has certain-
ly been made by men and its principles are therefore to be found within
the modifications of our human mind” [Vico, 2002: 96].
Vico maintains that the way into the world of nature lies through the
human world. He accounts for the process through which man’s entire
world (including the several conceptions of reality) develops and is struc-
tured. Vico accounts for an understanding of mind in all its complexity and
he grounds there a genetic understanding of the human world. He sees hu-
man labor as the foundation of the transformation of nature in such a way
that it becomes the means by which man, learning the meaning of change
and time, both creates and understands history. In this sense, Vico offers an
integrating vision of man and culture. Vico’s hermeneutics directs attenti-
on to the role of critical interpretation in understanding not only the huma-
nities but also the natural sciences, which are both considered as construc-
tions of the human mind.
Toulmin (one of the philosophers who shared with Wartofsky the aspi-
ration to integrate the history of science with the philosophy of science),
who is arguably strongly affected by Vichian ideas, states:
“The hermeneutic movement in philosophy and criticism has
done us a service by directing attention to the role of critical
interpretation in understanding the humanities. But it has done
us a disservice also because it does not recognize any
comparable role for the interpretation in the natural sciences
and in this way sharply separates the two fields of scholarship
and experience (...) The general categories of hermeneutics can
be applied as well to the natural sciences as to the humanities
(...) The natural sciences too are in the business of ‘construing
reality’” [Toulmin, 1982].
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1
For a further discussion of Vico’s view, from the perspective that concerns me here, see
Tagliacozzo (1983), which is my main reference in this section.
One could simply add a “-ct-“ so that the last sentence reads ‘the natu-
ral sciences too are in the business of ‘construCTing reality’, and thus it
would embrace the core idea of epistemic constructivism, as it is discussed
by Rockmore.
Comparing Marx and Vico brings forth several similarities in their line
of reasoning. They both maintain that surface events and phenomena are to
be explained by structures, data and phenomena below the surface. They
also share the contention that the explicit and the obvious is to be explained
by what is implicit and not obvious. Moreover, the view that understanding
human action and ideas requires an analysis of their social context is shared
by both of them. It is also so for the view that human knowledge of the
world emerges out of an interaction of the social subject and the object etc.
Both Vico and Marx reject traditional metaphysics. However, they do so in
quite different ways. Vico rejects the metaphysical view that deduces reali-
ty from a first truth, according to the scheme of Cartesianism. On the other
hand, Marx rejects Hegelian idealism, which dialectically deduces reality
and historicity a priori [cf. Tagliacozzo, 1983].
Since Rockmore convincingly argues for the vicinity of Hegel’s and
Vico’s lines of reasoning — at least with regard to the aspects of interest for
our discussion — I propose that, in a quest of an alternative to epistemic
constructivism, one could focus on these points that distinguish Marx’s
thinking from Hegel’s.
Marx understands knowledge as the appropriation of objective reality,
as its reproduction in thought in an ideal form. The real concrete is cogniti-
vely appropriated via the mediation of abstraction. Human beings con-
struct their mental representations of reality on the basis of concrete social
practice, which is ultimately grounded on objectively imposed social ne-
cessities. Since abstraction is employed, in the course of our cognitive inquiries
we reconstruct reality in an ideal form, which in turn is realizable in actuality.
Ilyenkovian insights on identity
E.V. Ilyenkov encounters with the traditional epistemological question
of the interrelations of thought and being in his Dialectical Logic [Ilyen-
kov, 1977], in which he runs the history of the conception of the ideal in
philosophy and investigates how this question is posed and answered by
the great philosophers of the past.
According to Ilyenkov, in any version of idealistic monism (i.e. in
Schelling and Hegel), which, as it has been discussed, is arguably related to
Parmenidean identity, Thus, the unfilled gap between thought and being
outside thought was surmounted by the identity of thinking in itself. In fact,
as Ilyenkov notes, Schelling and Hegel do not establish any identity of
thought and being, because they do not take into account ‘being as such’ –
free independent self-sufficient being existing outside and independently
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of thought [Ilyenkov, 1977: 212]. According to Ilyenkov, from the materia-
list point of view, the principle of the identity of the laws and forms of
thought and being states that “logical forms and patterns are nothing else
than realised universal forms and patterns of being, of the real world sensu-
ously given to man” [Ilyenkov, 1977: 222].
The conclusion that Ilyenkov draws is that the seeming gap between
consciousness and the real world becomes bridged, because, actually, there
was never any gap [Knuuttila, 2000: 197]. It is human social labour that
makes such a bridge useless, since it is the source of objectification of the
ideal. Therefore, not only is the ideal independent from the mental for its
existence, but the mental itself is social in its origin. Consciousness is awa-
kening, as the individual is confronted by the materially established spiritu-
al culture of the humanity [Ilyenkov, 1977: 81].
According to Ilyenkov, the fundamental forms of thought are not given
a priori but are realized historically as social consciousness and thought is
not embodied in utterances of language, but in the results of human activi-
ty. Ilyenkov contends that thought is realized in culture and in the humani-
zed environment, in what Marx called the “inorganic body of man”. Min-
dedness of individuals is not given, but emerges through the appropriation
of those modes of thought that are embodied in the practice of the commu-
nity constitutive of social consciousness and all modes of mindedness are
penetrated by conceptuality. As also McDowell argues, there is no gap bet-
ween mind and the world inherent in the very idea of thought, therefore
thought can be at one with the world [McDowell, 1994: 27]. As Bakhurst
analyzes, in Ilyenkov the objectification of human activity is considered to
be the source of the nature and possibility of thought and thought is the me-
ans by which the world is, or at least can be, disclosed to us [Bakhurst,
2013: 280]. Ergo, thought is able to embrace reality as it is.
Envoi
While the Parmenidian identity can be built upon in order to offer epis-
temic constructivism as an approach to cognition which radically differs
from and opposes to metaphysical realism, as Rockmore aptly discusses,
alternative interpretations may offer alternative approaches to cognition. En
route to disavow the distinction between ontology and epistemology, the dis-
cussion thus far points to that any ontological theory presupposes an episte-
mological theory. Thus, ontological and epistemological concerns merge in
one and the same magnifying lens which is employed in our inquiries.
On these grounds, I have tried to argue that if one is inclined to assert
both that the world is populated by cognizable objects of any kind and that
our attempts to describe and explain the world are fallible, s/he is not obli-
ged to adopt any variety of metaphysical realism – and the burden which
arguably comes with it. In such a line of reasoning, knowledge of the seve-
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ral worldly parts and processes is open to critique and susceptible of repla-l l l t i t iti ti l l
cement of the employed set of categories and relationships between
them2 . Such an understanding – which is only roughly formulated here – is
arguably capitulating between the merits of metaphysical realism and epis-
temic constructivism, as Rockmore discusses them.
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another interesting attempt, from a different perspective, to reconcile constructivist and realist
positions in epistemology by proposing the position of the constructive realism.
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